What We Learned from the Local Elections

It was an eventful, yet strange, set of local elections. In a way, you could argue that every major party was both quietly disappointed and relieved at the same time. While Reform, the Lib Dems, and the Greens all made significant gains, they still underperformed their polling expectations. The Tories and Labour, on the other hand, haemorrhaged a significant number of seats, yet both overperformed relative to polls that had predicted an apocalypse.

We know that Starmer’s toast — we’ve been saying it for well over a year now. We’re going to walk you through some lessons we’ve learned from the results and explore some potential value for the future.

The Greens have exposed their low ceiling

The Greens’ problem is not momentum, but reach. A gain of 441 councillors is significant, yet the party still underperformed the enormous expectations surrounding Polanski’s leadership. Despite favourable polling, a parliamentary by-election win, and predictions that they would emerge as the second-biggest party of the night (odds shortened as low as 2/7 at one point), the Greens finished a distant fifth and failed to seize control of key targets like Lewisham and Camden.

The reason is structural. Green support is deepening rather than broadening. Their coalition — affluent graduates, younger progressives, Muslim voters disillusioned with Labour, and boomer NIMBYs — works well in university cities and highly educated urban enclaves. But Britain remains far more socially conservative than progressive overall. Outside a narrow band of metropolitan seats, Green politics quickly hits a ceiling.

In effect, the Greens are competing for the old Corbynite map, but without Labour’s working-class base. Even in their strongest territory, they still have to dislodge Labour, something they have not yet shown they can consistently do. They can damage Labour in hyper-progressive areas; replacing it as the default party of the left is another matter entirely.

There are also growing signs that the Green coalition itself is unstable. Poor results in places like Richmond and Trafford, alongside councillor resignations in Norfolk over the party’s direction under Polanski, suggest tensions between the Greens’ ultra-progressive activists and more traditional local environmentalists are already emerging.

That is the real lesson of these elections. The Greens proved they can intensify support where conditions already favour them. What they failed to prove is that they can break beyond those niches and become a genuinely national force..

Reform can win anywhere… But will struggle to get a majority under FPTP

Reform’s results confirmed that Farage has built something far more serious than a protest party. Unlike the Greens, Reform demonstrated an ability to compete almost everywhere: post-industrial towns, coastal England, suburban seats, and even parts of Labour’s traditional heartlands. Their appeal is geographically broad in a way few insurgent parties manage. Yet the elections also exposed the limits Reform will face under First Past the Post.

Farage’s central objective was clear: destroy the Conservatives and replace them as the dominant force of the British right. These elections suggest he has not achieved that — at least not yet. The Tories remain resilient in key areas where Reform needs a breakthrough. In Scotland, for example, Reform improved significantly but still failed to become the primary vehicle for right-wing unionist voters, many of whom continue to back the Conservatives tactically. In Wales, meanwhile, anti-Labour sentiment remains split between Reform and Plaid Cymru, limiting Reform’s ability to consolidate a single anti-establishment bloc.

There are also signs of a hard ceiling in more liberal and highly educated parts of the country. Reform’s vote increase was notably weaker in Remain-heavy areas, suggesting the party’s coalition still depends heavily on Brexit-era political alignments. That matters because under FPTP, piling up huge majorities in Leave-voting seats is less electorally efficient than making inroads into suburban middle England.

At the same time, Farage has undeniably re-politicised British politics. Much like Trump in the United States, he is not simply mobilising disillusioned non-voters but also energising opponents. Some of those who sat out the 2024 election because a Labour victory seemed inevitable have now returned specifically to vote against Reform. That dynamic makes Reform uniquely polarising: they can generate enormous enthusiasm, but also equally intense resistance.

The projected national vote share of roughly 26% is therefore both impressive and revealing. It confirms Reform’s polling strength is real, even after the dip they experienced during the campaign. But it also underlines the scale of the challenge ahead. Twenty-six per cent is enough to fracture the political system and dominate headlines; it is not necessarily enough to secure a parliamentary majority under Britain’s electoral system.

Finally, Reform’s performance was likely flattered somewhat by the nature of local elections themselves. Older voters — who are disproportionately favourable to Reform and the Conservatives — tend to turn out at much higher rates in local contests. That does not invalidate the result, but it does suggest caution before assuming these numbers would translate directly into a general election electorate.

Kemi Badenoch is here to stay

For all the pre-election apocalyptic panic surrounding the Conservatives, these results were far from catastrophic for Kemi Badenoch. In fact, they strengthened her position considerably. The party ended the night toward the higher end of expectations, regained flagship councils such as Wandsworth and Westminster, improved its vote share on last year, and increased its overall seat total in London. None of this suggests a party on the verge of extinction.

More importantly, the Conservatives showed signs of recovery in exactly the kinds of places they must win back to remain electorally viable: affluent suburban and leafy Labour-facing marginals. Results in areas like Altrincham and Sale West point to a gradual reconsolidation of centre-right voters who may dislike Labour but remain unconvinced by Reform. That matters far more for long-term Tory survival than piling up votes in already safe rural seats.

The elections also demonstrated that the Conservatives still retain strategic advantages Reform cannot easily replicate. In Scotland, they remain the clear tactical choice for unionist right-wing voters, limiting Reform’s room for expansion. In Wales, despite Reform’s rise, the Conservatives continued to outperform expectations (with some polling giving them zero seats) in key areas; in places like Ceredigion, for instance, Reform won 23% while the Conservatives still secured a respectable 17%.

Crucially, Badenoch herself appears stronger than her party brand. While the Conservatives remain unpopular overall, Badenoch continues to outperform the party in personal ratings and remains one of the few major political figures with consistently competitive net favourability. At the same time, the Conservatives have quietly been narrowing the gap with Reform in national polling throughout the year, suggesting the post-election narrative of inevitable Tory collapse may have been overstated.

Taken together, these elections suggest Badenoch has stabilised the Conservative position far more effectively than many expected. Reform may dominate media attention, but the Tories remain deeply embedded institutionally, geographically, and tactically within the British electoral system. Far from being a temporary caretaker leader, Badenoch now looks increasingly secure — and potentially the politician best placed to prevent the complete realignment of the British right.

The SNP are sitting ducks

The SNP are entering their most vulnerable period in over two decades. Most notably, this was the first time since 2003 that the party’s vote share fell. After years of consistent growth, that decline undermines the sense of inevitability that has surrounded the SNP throughout much of the devolution era.

The party also lost six seats, and the result could have been worse were it not for Conservative and Reform voters splitting the unionist vote in several constituencies. If Reform continues to decline in Scotland, those votes are likely to return to Labour or the Conservatives, making many SNP seats far more competitive next time.

Reform’s future in Scotland looks bleak. Their campaign was chaotic, with multiple candidates stepping down, and it is difficult to see Malcolm Offord remaining a credible long-term opposition figure. A Reform collapse would likely help one of the traditional unionist parties consolidate anti-SNP support.

Pressure is also growing from within the independence movement itself. The Greens won two constituency seats and came close to a third, which will encourage them to contest more seats aggressively at the next election. That risks splitting the pro-independence vote in areas where the SNP previously benefited from tactical support.

Labour remains another major threat despite their recent slump. Scottish Labour had been leading the polls until the Starmer government’s popularity collapsed. A new UK leader or an improving political climate could quickly revive their fortunes north of the border.

Finally, the economic outlook may prove decisive. With the economy expected to worsen before it improves, the SNP face the burden of incumbency after nearly twenty years in power. Voters frustrated with living standards and public services may become increasingly open to alternatives.

The SNP are still likely to remain Scotland’s largest party, but they no longer appear untouchable. A recovering Labour Party, a consolidating unionist vote, growing Green confidence, and economic pressures all point to a much tougher election next time around.